America's 
Foreign Policy 



A CATECHISM 

By Charles P. Howland 
of the New York Bar 



Published by the American Rights Committee, 45, Cedar Street, 
Neio York City. 



America's 
Foreign Policy 



A CATECHISM 

By Charles P. Howland 
of the New York Bar 



n 



3V 



$1* 



By Transfer 

MAY 6 I I9V9 



AMERICAS FOREIGN POLICY 
A CATECHISM 

BY 

Charles P. Howland, of the New York Bar 



1. What has been the basis of traditional 
American school-teaching" about the Revolution ? 

Military story — tales of Continental heroism and English 
oppression — which (like the hatchet-ancl-cherry-tree myth 
invented by good old fiddling parson Weems) have passed 
into current legend. In the old school-books the Americans 
of the Revolutionary War were always noble and usually 
victorious ; the British always mercenary and usually 
defeated. 

2. What truth lies in this school-book tradition ? 

American historians have laughed at it for a generation, 
but politicians continue to use it for their own purposes. 

3. What were the political facts distinguished 
from this legendary military tradition ? 

(a) That the Colonies were peopled by England's middle 
and lower classes — people who earned their own living. 

(b) That England and also her colonies were at that time 
still controlled by an oligarchy of powerful nobles. 

(c) That the colonists fought for representation and 
democracy ; independence and nationality were the outcome. 

4. How did Englishmen view the struggle ? 

The best men and the best minds, like Burke and Fox, 
were making the same struggle for political liberty in 
England, and were therefore open advocates of the Colonies 
in their political aspirations. 

5. What was the outcome in England of this 
struggle for political liberty ? 

Entirely successful. But while the struggle on American 
soil was short and sharp by force of arms, it proved in the 
old country to be long and difficult, and was won by political 
and parliamentary weapons. Yet the results were the same ; 
England becnme a land of virtually manhood suffrage and of 
free political institutions. Public opinion controls its course, 

(7797) 



4 America's Foreign Policy. 

6. What has been the consequence to the world ? 

England has everywhere for a hundred years been regarded 
as a land of freemen. Her political institutions have been 
imitated to some extent by every civilized nation of the 
world. 

7. But does she not still own the South African 
colonies, New Zealand, Canada, and Australia, and 
treat them as she treated the American colonies ? 

She does not " own " Canada and these other " Colonies " 
any more than the United States owns the State of Penn- 
sylvania. England learned her lesson in the American 
Revolution and the following years. She voluntarily gave 
Canada her freedom, and all citizens of these so-called 
" colonies " have as much political and economic freedom 
as the citizens of California or Massachusetts. 

8. What has been the course of England's re- 
lations with the United States ? 

As the power of England's public opinion strengthened, 
her attitude towards the United States became more and more 
friendly. Our close commercial relations have sometimes 
created minor points of friction ; but a policy of give-and- 
take has always prevailed. To-day the two great English- 
speaking nations have more in common than any two 
nations of the earth. 

9. 'Wherein has England been of help to us in 
this sympathy of outlook and community of 
institutions ? 

In the protection of the " Monroe Doctrine." Germany 
is opposed to our policy for this hemisphere ; but the 
English fleet has always been in the path of German con- 
quest on this side of the world. 

The " Monroe Doctrine " is an American policy ; but it 
has not had the latent force necessary for its recognition by 
less friendly powers. The English have always viewed it 
with approval, and their fleet has given the backing 
necessary. 

10. But is not the English fleet a menace to us ? 

No. The English have no ambitions for aggrandizement 
in this hemisphere ; and besides, they want our help in the 
long future. 

The English fleet protects rather than threatens our com- 
merce ; for the English maintain free ports and free trade 
everywhere. 



America's Foreign Policy. 5 

11. Where do English and German policies 
differ, so far as they affect America ? 

Germany's policy has for fifty years been one of aggran- 
dizement by conquest, Many of her citizens have settled in 
Brazil and the Argentine. A free hand is all she needs for 
an attack upon one or more of the South American republics. 

12. Why has Germany formed this policy ? 

Because she thinks it pays. Three times she deliberately 
attacked a neighbor — Denmark, Austria, and France — and 
each time she added to herself territory and power. 

13. But is not the friendship of Germany and 
America so strong- that Germany would not 
disturb it ? 

Germany has no friendships. She has policies. Her 
apparent friendships are broken like her treaties. 

14. Has the United States any experience with 
this German characteristic ? 

In the Spanish war Germany and her allies tried to secure 
a general agreement in Europe for interference in Spain's 
behalf. England, however, decisively vetoed the suggestion 
of interference, and her control of the sea made action with- 
out her co-operation impossible. 

15. Has Germany ever betrayed her unfriendli- 
ness towards us by any overt act ? 

In the Spanish war, after Dewey's destruction of the 
Spanish fleet at Manila, the German Admiral Diederichs 
made a threatening demonstration with his five ships ; but 
it ceased as soon as Commodore Chichester's action showed 
the position which would be taken by the English navy. 

16. What was Germany after ? 

Her desire for aggrandizement by conquest is so strong 
that she could not bear to see any islands lying around 
" loose " which she could occupy. The affair was just 
important enough to disclose the German state of mind. It 
would have become of the utmost seriousness, if England 
had not backed us. 

1 7 . What bearing* have these historical con- 
siderations upon the issues of the present war ? 

German — or Prussian — militarism is due to the desire for 
conquest of the territory or the wealth of others by force 



6 America's Foreign Policy. 

This causes large military establishments which make a 
terrible burden to wage-earners in peace, and in the long 
run are certain to bring on war. Military autocracy also 
destroys political freedom by control of the press and by the 
suppression or manipulation of public opinion. The leading 
newspapers of Germany are practically government organs ; 
any independence even in times of peace leads to their 
suppression. 

18. Has militarism any effect upon the national 
character ? 

Yes. Part of it is " spying " in friendly countries, in- 
triguing against them among their own citizens, preparing 
the way for German armies or German violence. The two 
countries which ought best to understand this are Belgium 
and the United States. 

" FRIGHTFULNESS " (Schrecklichkeit) in war is another 
product of German militarism. It consists in disregarding 
the laws of God and man to such an extent that other nations, 
seeing that Germany stops at nothing, will succumb through 
fear. 

19. Why do Germans justify such doctrines ? 
Because they have come to believe. that they pay. 

20. How can they reconcile such doctrines with 
the dictates of Christian morals ? 

They do not try to do so. They avoid the inconsistency 
by saying that there is one set of morals for the individual 
and another set — or rather none at all — for the State. 

21. Can we accept such a doctrine ? 

God forbid ! The two great branches of the English- 
speaking race act through public opinion, which bases its 
judgment upon the dictates of personal morality, and in the 
long run they oblige their respective governments to conform 
to the moral standards of their citizens. 

22. Does this war then directly concern us ? 

The Prussians desire to reorganize the world on the basis 
of military autocracy. They insist that it is "right" for any 
country strong enough, and which thinks its interests enough 
involved, to overrun and absorb any other country ; the 
only reason for hesitation with them in any case is that of 
self-interest. The war, therefore, involves not only the 
liberties of Europe and of the world, but also the future of 
democracy. If international force is to be the test of survival, 



America's Foreign Policy. 7 

democracy cannot persist on the ground that it affords the 
best social programme and the highest individual develop- 
ment of its citizens ; the Prussian attitude makes a nation's 
ability to defend itself in a struggle imposed by others the 
sole standard of survival. Should European democracy fail 
in this crisis, America would be the last bulwark of popular 
government. For this fundamental reason there is a literal 
truth in the statement that the Allies are fighting oar 
battles. 

23. Shall we not satisfy morality if we remain 
strictly " neutral " ? 

Neutrality is essentially passive and in itself has no moral 
value. Obviously a great Power which, in a world-war that 
is determining the future course of civilization and con- 
sequently its own destiny as well, deliberately remains 
passive and abstains from aiding what it considers to be the 
cause of civilization is by this very fact placed upon the 
moral defensive. Its neutrality, instead of being meritorious, 
cannot escape condemnation. 

24. Have we an interest beyond the moral one 
or the indefinite political one ? 

Yes. If America is to have a voice in the world of the 
future and is to have power to protect her own interests, she 
must join her sympathies to that nation and that cause which 
most resembles her own. Isolated, she will be defenseless 
in the future. The democracy of England, of Australia and 
of Canada, and the protection their common fleet affords to 
our policies, are the best bulwarks of America's future. 

25. What relation have these thing's to 
America's duty in the way of military prepared- 
ness ? 

It is impossible to set any proper standard for military 
preparedness until we know definitely what are our foreign 
policies, our formal alliances (it we have any), and our 
informal diplomatic arrangements. If we have no policies 
or arrangements, and decide for " preparedness " against 
all the world, we shall need a fleet bigger than Japan's and 
England's combined and an army strong enough to meet 
Germany and Russia. 

All that sort of " preparedness " is absurd. The prepared- 
ness of policy must precede the preparedness of a navy and 
an army. 

26. What then should we do ? 

Throw our sympathies on the side of England and her 
allies. Pursue this line as the logic of events requires. 



8 America's Foreign Polio y . 

After the war, put ourselves into the closest and most 
sympathetic relations with Great Britain and France. 

27. But would not such an attitude be a break 
with the traditional policy of the United States in 
foreign affairs ? 

Quite the contrary. After a diplomatic understanding with 
Canning, England's foreign minister, Monroe promulgated 
his famous " Doctrine " as an obstacle to the plans of the 
" Holy Alliance " in this hemisphere. As soon as Thomas 
Jefferson heard of it he wrote jubilantly to Monroe : 

" WE BRING ENGLAND'S MIGHTY WEIGHT 
INTO THE SCALE OF FREE GOVERNMENT 
AND EMANCIPATE A CONTINENT AT ONE 
STROKE WHICH MIGHT OTHERWISE LINGER 
LONG IN DOUBT AND DIFFICULTY. GREAT 
BRITAIN IS THE NATION WHICH CAN DO 
US THE MOST HARM OF ANY ONE, OR ALL, 
ON EARTH; AND WITH HER ON OUR SIDE 
WE NEED NOT FEAR THE WHOLE WORLD. 
WITH HER THEN WE SHOULD MOST SEDU. 
LOUSLY CHERISH A CORDIAL FRIENDSHIP 
AND NOTHING WOULD TEND MORE TO KNIT 
AFFECTIONS THAN TO BE FIGHTING ONCE 
MORE SIDE BY SIDE IN THE SAME CAUSE." 



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